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Crossing Borders: Loving v. Virginia as a
Story of Migration
VICTOR

C.

ROMERO*

INTRODUCTION: BARRIERS TO BINATIONAL
SAME-GENDER MARRIAGES AND THE
PARALLELS TO LOVING
A.

Lessons from an Exam Hypothetical: The Case of Maria and
Jacoba

While a visiting professor at the Howard University School of
Law in 2005-06, I gave the following hypothetical to my Constitutional
Law II class as part of their final exam:
United States citizen Maria Camacho and Dutch foreign student Jacoba Mondriaan met and fell in love while classmates at
Dickinson College. Jacoba was attending college on a temporary
student visa, a federal government endorsement on her Dutch passport that permitted her to remain in the U.S. until she acquired her
four-year bachelor's degree. They planned to wed after graduation
and would have preferred to be married in Pennsylvania because
most of their mutual friends were from college and Maria's family
lived in Reading, Pennsylvania. Because Pennsylvania does not recognize same-gender marriages while the Netherlands does, Maria
and Jacoba chose to marry in Amsterdam in a beautiful ceremony
attended by both of their families.
Jacoba and Maria understood that while individual states typically regulate marriage, immigration policy is a federal matter left to
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (University Park) and Maureen B. Cavanaugh
Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State University, The Dickinson School of Law; e-mail:
vcrl@psu.edu; webpage: www.dsl.psu.edu/faculty/romero.cfm. My thanks to Laurence Nolan for
inviting me to participate in this important symposium, to Carlos Ball for his careful review of an
earlier draft, to the Howard Law Journaleditors for their thoughtful work on this piece, to Dean
Phil McConnaughay for his support of my work, and, most important, to Corie, Ryan, Julia, and
Matthew, and my family in the Philippines for their constant love and encouragement. Any
errors that remain are mine alone.
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Congressional legislation (which reflects the Constitution's Article I
mandate that Congress "establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization" 1 and "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 2 ). Aside
from the fact that Pennsylvania does not recognize same-gender
marriages, federal law does not confer benefits upon same-gender
partners under Congress's Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA) 3, which limits the definition of "marriage" to heterosexual unions, to preserve the rights of states, most of which, like Pennsylvania, grant no affirmative legal rights to gay couples. Thus, after
their Dutch wedding, Jacoba could not formally immigrate to the
U.S. as Maria's spouse because DOMA limits family immigration to
heterosexual married couples only.
Nevertheless, prior to graduating and her foreign student visa
expiring, Jacoba had secured an offer of employment from a prominent engineering firm, which was willing to sponsor her immigration
to the U.S. She returned to Philadelphia from Amsterdam not on a
"family-based" visa (since U.S. immigration law would likely not
recognize her as Maria's spouse), but on a temporary "employmentbased" visa 4 (since she had a position with the engineering firm).
Even though she possessed a temporary visa only, Jacoba was reassured by the engineering firm that it believed she would do
splendidly and fully expected that after a short probationary period
she would be offered a permanent position facilitated by the firm's
petition that she be granted a "green card," indicating her lawful
permanent residence in the U.S.5 Their futures apparently secure,
Maria and Jacoba settled into a quiet townhouse in Philadelphia,
looking forward to many years of marital bliss.
Unfortunately, because of the economic downturn caused in
part by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the engineering
firm decided not to extend her an offer of permanent employment,
nor did they petition for her "green card." Before her temporary
visa expired, Jacoba tried to secure other employment, but to no
avail. Jacoba also considered applying for a foreign student visa 6 to
attend graduate school, but she and Maria had to rely on both of
1. U.S.
2. U.S.

CONST.. art. I,
CONST., art. I.

§ 8, cl. 4.
§ 8, cl. 3.

3. 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
4. This is commonly referred to as an "H-1B visa." See Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 101(a)(15)(H)(1)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
5. A "lawful permanent resident" is a noncitizen allowed to reside in the U.S. permanently, and is the status that one possesses before becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. See INA
§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
6. Most foreign students receive the so-called "F-i" visa. See INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i).
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their incomes to pay off their hefty private school loans from Dickinson College, so this was not a viable strategy.
Fearful that the federal U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") 7 - the immigration enforcement arm of the executive branch - might deport Jacoba to Holland, Jacoba and Maria
filed a petition to have the ICE recognize their Dutch marriage as
valid, thereby allowing Jacoba to remain in the U.S. as Maria's
spouse. The ICE denied the petition citing DOMA, and it informed
the couple that it intended to initiate proceedings to deport Jacoba
once her temporary work visa expired.
A desperate Jacoba and Maria filed for injunctive and declaratory relief in federal district court challenging the ICE's denial of
their petition based on DOMA. Specifically, they asserted that
DOMA's limitation of "marriage" to heterosexual unions violated
8
their substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
In their answer, I hoped the students would draw an analogy to
Loving v. Virginia,9 the landmark case outlawing state antimiscegenation laws as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and whose fortieth anniversary
the Howard Law Journal has wisely sought to celebrate. The Due
Process argument contends that marriage is a fundamental, constitutionally-protected right, and that Loving disallowed any state from
preventing marriage between consenting adults of different races;
analogously, same-gender couples should benefit under this broad
conception of marriage, too. Nothing in Loving limits its application
to heterosexual couples only. The equal protection argument proceeds similarly: sexual orientation, like race, is an invidious, arbitrary
way of limiting the benefits of a state-sanctioned marriage.
B.

Lessons from Reality: Restrictions on Free Movement Now and
Then

For those who have followed the national debate on same-gender
marriage, the preceding arguments may be familiar, but the one wrinkle that I add to the mix (and that I hope my better students latch on
to) is the migration issue, which forces us to consider not just state
laws and current cultural norms, but international and federal law as
7. See generally Immigration and Customs Home Page, http://www.ice.gov., for more information about Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
8. Victor C. Romero, Constitutional Law II, Final Exam (Dec. 2005) (unpublished final
exam, Howard University School of Law) (on file with author).
9. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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well. Note that in my hypothetical, Maria and Jacoba are from different countries, which thus brings into play not only Pennsylvania's laws
regarding marriage, but also the Netherlands' laws permitting samegender marriage, the federal DOMA, and Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as well.
This admixture of state, federal, and international legal norms is
particularly interesting in light of Loving not just theoretically, but
also because, sadly, many binational same-gender couples in the U.S.
experience similar dilemmas today. In May 2004, the Los Angeles
Times reported a surge in travel to Massachusetts by many gay and
lesbian couples, hoping to capitalize on that state's monumental decision to be the first to recognize same-gender marriages.1 ° At least one
couple chose not to participate in the mass nuptials: American Austin
Naughton and his partner of many years, a Spanish national here on a
non-immigrant visa, decided not to wed for fear that this act would
signal an intent to permanently reside in the U.S., which would be
forbidden under his visitor status. As Naughton put it, "If we marry,
he could be deported."1 1 Like Naughton, U.S. citizen Richard Adams
has a partner who is also a foreign national. Unlike Naughton's partner, Australian Tony Sullivan's visa has long since expired, and so,
Adams and Sullivan are "fugitives" from the ICE, keeping a low profile, living quietly somewhere in the United States.' 2 Over twenty
years ago, Adams and Sullivan sued the immigration bureau at the
time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), arguing that
their receipt of a marriage license in Colorado allowed Adams to petition for Sullivan's "immediate relative" status as his "spouse." The
Ninth Circuit in Adams v. Howerton1 3 ruled that while the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not define the term "spouse," the
INS's decision to limit its reach to heterosexual relationships was ra10. Elizabeth Mehren, Massachusetts Begins Allowing Gays to Wed, L.A. TIMES, May 17,
2004, at A10. Currently, there is a strong movement within the state to amend its constitution to
restrict marriages to heterosexuals only.
11. Id. More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts barred non-resident
same-gender partners from marrying in the state if their home states expressly prohibited such
marriages. Cote-Whitacre v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006). Hence, if Maria and Jacoba, for example, had been U.S. citizens and residents of Arkansas, which recently
passed a constitutional amendment restricting marriage to heterosexuals only, the Cote-Whitacre
ruling provides that they would not have been allowed to marry in Massachusetts.
12. VICrOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
EQUALITY IN AMERICA 159 (2005) (describing Adams's and Sullivan's current situation).

13. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). In basing its decision solely on the text of the INA, the
Ninth Circuit did not reach the question of whether the couple's marriage was valid under state
law. Id. at 1038-39.
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tional. (It is worth noting that, in its original denial of Adams's petition, the INS stated: "You have failed to establish that a bona fide
marital relationship can exist between two faggots.") 14 As a consequence, Adams and Sullivan have never been able to fully receive the
blessings of liberty that other American couples enjoy. Sullivan attributes their present financial difficulties to his "outlaw" status: "We
would probably own our own home. We both love to travel. We
would have been able to travel. I would have been a professional of
some kind." 15 In sum, the hardships that Adams and Sullivan faced
beginning in the 1980s, and those endured by Naughton and his partner today, parallel the struggles of Mildred and Richard Loving during
the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement - not only in the obvious
parallels between race and sexual orientation as barriers to freedom,
but also in the way the law uses these immutable characteristics to
limit the freedom of movement.
C.

Loving The Freedom of Movement: Physical, Legal, and
Cultural Migration

It is this freedom of movement - this migration or immigration
- that I want to focus on in this essay. Lest we forget, the Lovings'
story is, importantly, a story of migration: It's a story of the great
lengths to which an interracial couple would travel - physically, culturally, and legally - to win justice and equality.
The facts of Loving v. Virginia are familiar to most and deserve
only a brief recitation here to highlight this theme of movement and
travel. Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Perry Loving, a
white man, were residents of Virginia who had traveled to nearby
Washington, D.C., in 1958 so that they could marry. At the time, Virginia, like many southern states,1 6 banned intermarriages between
whites and nonwhites, and made it a crime to travel to another jurisdiction to evade the ban. And so, when the Lovings returned to Caroline County, Virginia, they were promptly arrested for violating the
antimiscegenation laws. The Lovings pled guilty and their one-year
sentence was suspended for twenty-five years on the condition that
14. ROMERO, supra note 12, at 153-54.
15. JOYCE MURDOCH AND DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V.
THE SUPREME COURT 224 (2001).
16. At the time Loving was decided, Virginia was one of sixteen states that had antimiscegenation laws on their books. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5 (naming Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia).
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they leave the state and not return for twenty-five years.1 7 Having
been effectively banished from home, the Lovings took up residence
in Washington, D.C. It was from the place of their marriage that they
began their assault on Virginia's, and fourteen other states', antimiscegenation laws, via a class action lawsuit.
Although they predictably lost their appeal within the Virginia
appeals court system, the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren
penning the opinion, found unanimously in their favor on both due
process and equal protection grounds. Under the Due Process
Clause, Warren wrote: "Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State."1 8 And pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, the Court concluded: "The fact that Virginia prohibits
only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We have consistently
denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of
citizens on account of race." 19
Loving therefore reveals the extent to which the Court affirmed
the couple's desire for free physical, legal, and cultural movement - to
break barriers erected by the law that restricted their physical movement (they could not live in Virginia, their home state), their legal
movement (they could not legally wed within Virginia), and their cultural movement (they could not wed outside of their respective races).
Forty years later, Richard Adams and Tony Sullivan, Austin Naughton
and his unnamed Spanish partner, and yes, my hypothetical Maria Camacho and Jacoba Mondriaan, face similar physical, legal, and cultural
restrictions on their movement because of their sexual orientation.
Describing the current difficulties posed by his relationship with Richard Adams, Tony Sullivan aptly put it: "We would have been able to
travel . .. "
17. One wonders whether the trial judge thought that in twenty-five years' time, the remaining sixteen states that had antimiscegenation laws on their books would repeal them. He
may not have suspected that it would take but a few years for the Supreme Court to outlaw all
such rules in the case that he in fact presided over! More recently, the twenty-five year sunset
period has come into vogue once again with former Justice O'Connor's pronouncement in Grutter v. Bollinger that she "expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further" diversity in law school admissions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 343 (2003).
18. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
19. Id. at 11-12.
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This essay will demonstrate how the Lovings' story is, at bottom,
a story of migration across physical, legal, and cultural barriers. It is a
border-crossing story that parallels and provides support for the struggles of binational same-gender partners today. I will discuss each of
the three aspects of movement I've identified above - the physical,
legal, and cultural - starting with a brief discussion of physical migration in Part I below.
I.

LOVING: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS TO
PHYSICAL MOVEMENT

Perhaps because it is most obvious, the parallel between the immigration struggles of binational same-gender partners today and the
physical travel engaged in by the Lovings during the 1960s requires
little further explication than what has already been established
above. Stated plainly, just as the Lovings were limited in where they
could move to and reside, Richard Adams and Tony Sullivan are similarly limited in their physical movement today. In fact, Adams and
Sullivan are in the same position now that the Lovings found themselves in immediately after their D.C. marriage and their return to
Virginia: living in the shadow of the law, fugitives unable to reside as
others would in their communities.
Although a critic might respond that the law posed no physical
restraint on either the Lovings or the Adams-Sullivans, the punitive
nature of the then existing antimiscegenation law in Loving and the
narrow reading of the INA in Adams v. Howerton serve as the functional equivalent of a physical obstacle. Indeed, in the Lovings' case,
their violation of Virginia's law led to their incarceration, a palpable
restriction on their freedom to move; similarly, should Sullivan's
whereabouts be discovered, his deportation to Australia would constitute his physical removal from the U.S. against his will. Put differently, the intangible wall of the law is as formidable a force as a
tangible barrier, limiting these couples' movements between jurisdictions in much the same way.
After considering this physical aspect of movement, it is the legal
context of migration that will be explored in Part II. I will examine
the ways in which U.S. immigration law operates to erect barriers to
movement that parallel the hardships the Lovings endured under Virginia's antimiscegenation statute, while simultaneously highlighting
the differences that make these parallels unpersuasive to some. Spe2007]
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cifically, I will argue how the Supreme Court's deference to Congress's plenary power within immigration law creates a limit on the
extent to which Loving may serve as a vehicle to revisit Adams v.
Howerton's affirmation of a limited definition of "spouse" restricted
to those in heterosexual relationships only.
Part III will round out this migration trilogy by exploring the
ways in which the Court has addressed the cultural migration that has
occurred within race and sexual orientation, looking specifically at recent key gay rights cases and how Loving v. Virginia may or may not
provide a useful lens through which to view the question of binational
same-gender marriages. While progress had been made on the issue
20
of gay rights, as evidenced by the Court's rulings in Romer v. Evans
and Lawrence v. Texas, 21 their most recent decision, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR),22 should give gay
rights advocates pause, suggesting that race and sexual orientation
may be doomed to follow separate, and hardly ever analogous, paths.
Finally, I will conclude this essay by arguing that perhaps the best
solution to the dilemma of the binational same-gender partner lies not
in the courts, but in Congress. The Uniting American Families Act of
2005 (UAFA)2 3 may be the second-best solution that, while it does not
elevate same-gender partners to the same status as marriage, at least
allows them the opportunity to cross that physical barrier - the barrier
that separates Adams from Sullivan, just as land and sea separate the
U.S. from Australia - allowing the couples to fight another day the
larger battles over the broader recognition of same-gender relationships in all the states of the union.
II.

LOVING AND IMMIGRATION: BREAKING DOWN THE
BARRIERS TO LEGAL MOVEMENT

Apart from examining how the antimiscegenation laws effectively
prevented the Lovings' physical travel to and residence in Virginia, it
is likewise important to understand how these state laws compare and
20. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
21. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22. 126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006).
23. H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005). A similar bill was also introduced in the Senate, entitled
the Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2005, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005), which is an updated version of a bill originally introduced in 2003. In this essay, I will refer to the House title
of the bill because I think it seeks to achieve what should be the goal of the legislation - to
promote U.S. immigration policy's goal of keeping families together.
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contrast with the federal immigration statutes and regulations that
limit the movement of foreign guests in our country.
Aside from their ability to restrict movement, Virginia's antimiscegenation statute and current immigration laws are alike because
both preclude couples from availing themselves of benefits bestowed
upon similarly situated couples deemed to be validly married under
the jurisdiction's laws. Virginia's ban on interracial marriages meant
that the Lovings could not lawfully present themselves as a married
couple for purposes of state income tax, inheritance, family, and insurance laws, among others, while white couples could. Similarly, even if
their civil union was recognized by Colorado, Adams and Sullivan
could not avail themselves of the myriad federal benefits that attach
when a U.S. citizen is able to petition lawful permanent residence status for his spouse. One advocacy group estimates that over 1,100 federal and state benefits come with the legal status of marriage.2 4
Clearly, aside from the physical freedom to move, there are measurable, pecuniary benefits that come with expanding the legal borders of
marriage and immigration law that were denied the Lovings because
of their mixed-race status in 1967, and that continue to be denied to
same-gender binational couples some forty years later.
Even as they work similar disabilities upon the couples, there are
differences between the antimiscegenation laws at issue in Loving and
the restrictive immigration laws at work today. First and foremost,
they differ because one is a state law on marriage, while the other
governs federal law on the movement of noncitizens between the U.S.
and other nations. This basic difference has an impact on both the
scope and status of the law in American jurisprudence.
As to scope, state marriage laws govern only their state's residents - indeed, that is why the Lovings traveled to nearby Washington, D.C. They knew that the antimiscegenation laws of Virginia held
no power over them in the District of Columbia. In contrast, because
immigration laws are federal, they have a broader scope, reaching
across all fifty states. Thus, even if Adams and Sullivan (or Naughton
and his Spanish partner, more pointedly) got married in Massachusetts, Adams's rights to petition the Australian Sullivan to immigrate
24. "Not only does [marriage] bring the stability of a committed relationship, but also more
than 1,138 automatic federal and additional state protections, benefits and responsibilities designed to support and protect family life." Lambda Legal, Why Marriage Equality Matters, http:/
/www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/publications/facts-backgrounds/page.jsp?itemID=31988962 (last
visited on June 21, 2006).
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derive solely from his being a U.S. citizen and are accordingly governed by one uniform, federal immigration law.
A law's status follows from its scope. As state laws, marriage
laws are subject to the restrictions of the federal Constitution. While
the Rehnquist Court did much to limit federal power vis-A-vis the sovereign states,25 it has long been recognized that the Constitution limits
what states can do within their own jurisdictions. As Chief Justice
Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison, the Constitution is the "supreme law of the land, ' 26 and so, Loving can be properly understood
as a case in which equality principles enshrined in the Constitution
prohibited Virginia's marriage laws from treating U.S. citizens within
its territory differently from others based solely on skin color. Federal
immigration law, by contrast, enjoys a higher status than state law in
American jurisprudence, not because it is superior to state marriage
law,27 but because the Supreme Court has seen fit to defer to Congress in immigration matters, finding few constitutional bases for
striking down otherwise discriminatory immigration regulation.
This second difference, the way in which the Supreme Court has
treated state law matters less deferentially than immigration law
under due process and equal protection analysis, is worth exploring in
more detail. As explained more fully below, this difference ultimately
persuades me to believe that the Supreme Court will likely not find
Loving particularly useful as a tool for understanding immigration restrictions on binational same-gender relationships.
From Loving we learn that a state may not bless same-race marriages only because the U.S. Constitution forbids such racial discrimination against its citizens, even if they reside within that particular
state. As Chief Justice Warren stated in his equal protection analysis,
"We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which
restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. ' 28 This statement has
deep roots in an earlier 19th century opinion demonstrating the
25. During the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist Court began a curtailment of congressional power
over intrastate activities, thereby limiting the reach of both Congress's Commerce Clause power
and its Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting Commerce Clause power); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (limiting Section 5 power).
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).
27. Indeed, the doctrine of dual federalism recognizes that the federal and state governments and their laws stand on equal footing, although both are inferior to the U.S. Constitution.
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (discussing the doctrine of "dual
sovereignty").
28. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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Court's willingness to tamp down state-sanctioned racial discrimination, even if not facially obvious. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to
strike down a San Francisco ordinance that required all laundries to
apply for an operating permit because the municipality clearly discriminated against all Chinese laundry operators even though the ordinance itself was facially neutral.2 9 Thus, Loving and Yick Wo teach
us that the Court will not abide state-sponsored racial discrimination
either in the writing or in the enforcement of a statute.
In immigration law, however, the Court has taken a different
path, as demonstrated by a pair of cases decided around the same time
as Yick Wo. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States3" and Fong Yue Ting
v. United States,3 1 the Court held that, within immigration law, the
Supreme Court must defer to the political branches of government
because Congress, and not the Court, was in the best position to create a national policy on immigration. At first glance, this deference
seems quite reasonable. The Constitution requires Congress to make
a "uniform rule of Naturalization" and immigration rules - those that
govern when noncitizens may enter and must leave the U.S. - are certainly a rational outgrowth of that power.
However, both the Chae and Fong cases grew out of a national
policy of excluding Chinese immigrant workers born of xenophobia
and economic nativism. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, aimed at putting an end to Chinese immigration that had
begun much earlier for the purpose of supplying cheap labor to build
the railroads out west. The Chae and Fong cases examined the scope
of Congress's power under the Act.
Chae involved a long-time resident of the U.S. who, learning he
would be returning to China for a visit, obtained permission from the
U.S. government to return. At port, Chae presented his credentials to
the immigration authorities who, without hearing an adequate explanation, revoked them, excluding Chae from re-entering the U.S. The
Supreme Court held that, as a sovereign nation, the United States
held absolute authority to exclude any foreign citizen it wanted, and
that this power resided in the political branches of the federal government. Chae and other noncitizens had no right to be in the United
States, but instead only enjoyed a privilege that could be revoked at
29. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
30. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
31. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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will. Justice Field's opinion was replete with racial bias. After favorably describing America's magnanimity in allowing the Chinese to
work in the U.S., Field lamented that "they remained strangers in the
land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and
usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any change in their habits or modes
of living."3 Field also referred to the immigrants as "vast hordes [of
people] crowding in upon us." 33
Fong extended Chae's holding by ruling that Congress had plenary power to deport noncitizens, not to be second-guessed by the
judiciary. Under the Chinese Deportation Act of 1892, Fong was required to establish that he was a resident of the U.S. by producing a
credible white witness to affirm his claim; he was unable to do so and
was ordered deported. Arguing that the white witness provision violated due process norms, Fong challenged his deportation, but was
rebuffed by the Court. Citing Chae extensively, Justice Gray had no
trouble finding for the government:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the
government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of congress,
and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far the judicial department has been
authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount
law of the Constitution, to intervene.3 4
While Loving and Yick Wo affirm the Supreme Court's commitment to racial equality, Chae and Fong, which have never been overruled, highlight the limits of that commitment within the context of
immigration law. While it is true that in recent years, the Court has
provided basic due process protections to noncitizens, 3 5 at least one
lower court has recently held that Arab-Muslim plaintiffs who claim
they have been detained longer than others based solely on their race
and religion may not pursue an equal protection claim for selective
prosecution. 36 As in Chae and Fong, the court specifically cited the
32. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
33. Id. at 606.
34. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
35. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
Both cases limit the power of the government to indefinitely detain removable noncitizens.
36. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-2307(JG), Memorandum and Order. at 77-80 (June 14,
2006) (granting government's motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection claim regarding selective detention based on race and religion), (available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/
rulings/cv/2002/02cv2307mo-f.pdf) (last visited on June 21, 2006).
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federal political branches' plenary power over immigration law to justify its dismissal of plaintiffs' claim.37
Because of the difference between the way our constitutional jurisprudence treats state laws from immigration laws, deferring to the
second but not the first, binational same-gender partners will likely
have a difficult time using Loving to curry favor with justices whose
precedents dictate a political rather than a legal solution to the thorny
issue of immigration law. 38
From the legal issues, in Part III we move to the cultural barriers
that need to be overcome. Although marriage is certainly a legal status, I treat the issue of race and same-gender marriages as cultural
phenomena, and indeed, we will shortly discover that the Supreme
Court appears to do this as well, as exhibited by its unwillingness to
appear to second-guess the dominant culture on issues involving sexual orientation. Instead, the Court has taken the rather safe route of
couching certain same-gender issues as universal ones, much in the
same way that the Warren Court did in Loving and throughout the
civil rights years.
III.

LOVING AND MARRIAGE: BREAKING DOWN THE
BARRIERS TO CULTURAL MOVEMENT

While the legal analysis in Loving focused mostly on the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court threw in a brief discussion of the Due
Process Clause for good measure:
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
To deny
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival ....
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to deprive all
the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law .... Under
our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of
37. Id. at 77-78.
38. While some courts have held that immigration rules burdening bona fide spousal relationships violate the constitutional right to marry, none have held that the immigration ban
against same-gender marriages is itself unconstitutional. See, e.g., Manwani v. INS, 736 F. Supp.
1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (holding that INA's mandatory two year residence requirement as applied
to lawful spouses is unconstitutional). See also Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97.
99 n.6 (1996).
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another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State.39

The thrust of Warren's due process opinion focuses on the right
of all persons to marry as a basic, fundamental right that the U.S.
Constitution protects. While his equal protection analysis focuses on
the unequal treatment received by nonwhites and their partners, Warren's due process analysis rests squarely on the idea that all persons in
the United States have a right to marry, and that the decision whether
to marry or not is an individual, human one, not to be interfered with
by the state.
Unfortunately, while the promise of such due process analysis
suggests that there are no rights that can be denied any person, and
indeed, race has been firmly established as a line that states may not
blithely cross, the Supreme Court has not been so bold in the context
of gay rights, opting instead to find only a minimum quantum of rights
that gay and lesbian persons enjoy and that government is required to
respect - rights which heterosexuals take for granted. The Court's
decisions in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas are but two examples of this approach.
At issue in Romer v. Evans was the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, passed by voters ostensibly to
deny "special rights" to those of homosexual or bisexual orientation.
Responding to ordinances ensuring equal treatment for gays and lesbians passed in cities like Boulder and Aspen, opponents sought to
prevent this trend by way of a state constitutional amendment. Interestingly, the lead-up to the referendum was tinged with racial rhetoric
in which proponents of Amendment 2 compared gays and lesbians to
white males, arguing that neither group required special protection
from discrimination, and that Boulder and Aspen were wasting scarce
resources that should be conserved to battle true discrimination
against minorities and women.4 ° In the end, it appeared that
Coloradans were uncertain about the scope of the proposal. While
the measure passed by a slim 53.4 percent to 46.6 percent margin, exit
polls conducted by the Denver Post revealed that most Coloradans
would have favored antidiscrimination laws to protect gays and lesbians in housing and employment.4 1 Whether the Supreme Court was
39. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
40. See EVAN GERSTMANN,

THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS:
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 99-105 (1999).

GAYS, LESBIANS, AND

41. Id. at 105.
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aware of this history when it voted is unclear, but the Justices struck
down Amendment 2 by a 6-to-3 vote.
Relying on an Equal Protection Clause analysis, Justice Kennedy
viewed the measure as a clear example of unconstitutional animus visited by a hostile majority upon a vulnerable underclass:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second,
its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.4 2
Although it would be tempting to read this case as a strong vote in
favor of gay rights and against sexual orientation discrimination, one
wonders whether the suit really was about a group's access to the political process. Unlike statutes or ordinances, a state constitutional
amendment has a particular force that bypasses regular legislative
processes and purports to convey fundamental ideals of its citizenry.
If the Post's exit polls are to be believed and Coloradans actually favored some antidiscrimination laws for gays and lesbians, then maybe
the Court's ruling was meant to remedy voter confusion by allowing
them the opportunity not to be bound by a constitutional provision
that did not accurately express their will. Put simply, Coloradans did
not get what they thought they were voting for when they passed
Amendment 2, and the Court's opinion in Romer corrected that error.
In Lawrence v. Texas, however, the Court made clear that Romer
was primarily about animosity toward gays and lesbians rather than
about access to the political process. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy cited Romer as one of two important cases that influenced
his thinking about the constitutionality of anti-sodomy statutes directed against gays and lesbians.43 The majority struck down Texas's
anti-sodomy law, finding that its terms criminalized conduct engaged
in primarily by gays and lesbians. As such, it overruled its decision in
42. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 ("The second post-Bowers case of principal relevance is
Romer v. Evans. There the Court struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.... We concluded that the provision was 'born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected' and further that it had no rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose.").
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Bowers v. Hardwick,4 4 finding that the Due Process Clause guaranteed a floor of liberty for all persons to engage in private, sexual conduct free from government interference: "Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosex45
ual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.
In the majority's view, moral disapproval of same-gender sexual conduct is not enough to justify the state's penal encroachment on personal privacy.
While the Court affirmed its Romer commitment to protecting
gays and lesbians from animus in Lawrence, the majority did not
clearly set forth the limits of its holding, prompting both Justices
O'Connor and Scalia to fill the gap. Justice O'Connor chose not to
join Kennedy's majority opinion, relying solely on an equal protection
analysis to conclude that the Texas statute bespoke animus against
gays and lesbians. She did, however, make clear that the anti-sodomy
law was irrational in a way that bans against same-sex marriage were
not. The latter bans, she argued, were rational because they were
46
meant to preserve "the traditional institution of marriage.
In dissent, Scalia ridiculed O'Connor's analysis, claiming that
there was no rational way to distinguish the moral basis for approving
heterosexual marriages from the moral disapproval of anti-sodomy
laws:
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Justice O'Connor seeks to preserve them by the conclusory statement that 'preserving the traditional institution of marriage' is a legitimate state interest. But
'preserving the traditional institution of marriage' is just a kinder
way of describing the State's moral disapprovalof same-sex couples.
Texas's interest in [its anti-sodomy law] could be recast in similarly
euphemistic terms: 'preserving the traditional sexual mores of our
society.' In the jurisprudence Justice O'Connor has seemingly created, judges can validate laws by characterizing them as 'preserving
the traditions of society' (good); or invalidate them by characterizing them as 'expressing moral disapproval' (bad).47
From Romer to Lawrence, then, we can discern a positive trend to
provide greater protection for gay rights, despite the Court's reluctance to apply anything more than the traditional rational basis test to
44.
45.
46.
47.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 601-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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strike down homophobic legislation. Because nothing in the Lawrence majority opinion specifically limits its holding to anti-sodomy
laws, gay rights advocates may conclude that, like Scalia, the justices
may come to embrace Loving as persuasive precedent for finally outlawing state bans on same-gender marriages. Returning to the idea of
traversing cultural divides, gay rights advocates might actually take
heart in the following words of Justice Scalia:
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some
opprobrium
homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral 48
that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.
If Scalia is right, the day may not be far away when a majority of the
Court may find that bans against same-gender marriage, like anti-sodomy laws and homophobic constitutional amendments, do not reflect
the appropriate cultural norm. When that time comes, the Court will
be able to make that cultural move, to travel that cultural divide, using
Loving as its guide.
However, lest anyone is tempted to declare outright victory in the
war against same-gender marriage bans, one needs to read carefully
the Court's latest statement on gay rights, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, to conclude that any optimism growing out of Romer and Lawrence must be
tempered with a dose of realpolitik. Decided in 2006, FAIR was a
challenge to the notorious Solomon Amendment's requirement that
law schools provide equal access to students for all employment
recruiters, including the military, or else the schools would forfeit federal funding. The law schools sued, arguing that the law violated their
free speech rights by forcing them to promote the military's less-thanfavorable view of gays and lesbians (as embodied in their infamous
"Don't ask, don't tell" policy4 9 ), a view that was contrary to the law
48. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces:
(b) Policy.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the
following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in
such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another
to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are further findings, made
and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations, that
the member has demonstrated that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior;
SB such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
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schools' beliefs, at the risk of forgoing federal funding. A unanimous
Court sided with the government, ruling that the Solomon Amendment's requirements did not violate the law schools' free speech
rights. At best, the law regulated conduct, not speech, by requiring
the law schools to provide the military the same access to students as
it did to other employers. If they disagreed with the government's
stand on gays and lesbians in the military, schools were free to express
that view to their students.5 °
For our purposes, what may be most interesting is Chief Justice
Roberts's single reference to race in this case. Among other things,
FAIR had argued that because law schools were forced to communicate military recruiters' information via e-mail and flyer, the government was compelling them to speak in violation of the First
Amendment. In rejecting this view, Roberts stated that such compulsion was merely an incidental infringement on speech pursuant to a
valid regulation of the schools' conduct. To illustrate, the majority
opinion used an example of an anti-racial discrimination command:
"Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from discriminating
in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading 'White Applicants Only' hardly
means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the employer's speech rather than conduct."'" What is unclear is why this
illustration does not work in the law schools' favor in arguing for gay
rights. If the law school has an acknowledged right to advocate
against sexual orientation bias, why can't it require the military to
have to modify its conduct, by, for example, setting up temporary private recruitment facilities off campus? Under this interpretation, the
military would still be free to advocate and enforce its "Don't ask,
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued
presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed
forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or
words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved in
accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (2007).
50. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307 ("The Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools
may say nor requires them to say anything. Law schools remain free under the statute to express
whatever views they may have on the military's congressionally mandated employment policy,
all the while retaining eligibility for federal funds.").
51. Id. at 1308.

[voL. 51:53

Loving v. Virginia as a Story of Migration
don't tell" policy, but it may not use law school resources to promote
that view.
In rejecting FAIR's arguments, perhaps the Court is promoting
two ideas, relevant to the difference between race and sexual orientation, on the one hand, and the difference between congressional and
private power, on the other. First, the animating force behind Roberts's analogy is that, culturally, society has come to accept racial
equality as a given. Thus, it is no surprise that a federal government
would properly be able to require employers not to discriminate
against nonwhites. Our culture has already made the shift from Jim
Crow to integration - in our migratory metaphor, it has already immigrated to a better place of racial equality. No such migration has fully
taken place with respect to sexual orientation discrimination.5"
Second, and evocative of our earlier discussion about Congress's
power over immigration law, the FAIR case highlights the divide the
Court draws between public and private power. In assessing the Solomon Amendment, the Court cited Congress's plenary power over the
military, noting that, while Congress chose to regulate military recruiting at schools through the Spending Clause, similar deference should
be accorded to the legislative decision on how to properly support the
military.5 3 This deference to Congress in military affairs parallels the
deference the Court affords Congress over immigration law. It is not
surprising, then, that when a political body like Congress attempts to
legislate for the good of the United States as a whole, it will adopt
policies most in line with what it perceives its constituents want. In
the context of military recruiting, Congress and the military have
taken a rather conservative line with respect to balancing the desire of
gays and lesbians to serve in the armed forces against the corps' concern about perceived threats to morale and unit cohesion. Congress is
no less conservative in immigration policy: At the margin, it is unwilling to recognize the ability of a lesbian U.S. citizen married in the
52. Indeed, in the analogy to gay rights that I draw above, I make a weaker claim than that
presented in the Roberts hypothetical: that the military may discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, but may not use law school facilities to do so.
53. "Although Congress has broad authority to legislate on matters of military recruiting, it
nonetheless chose to secure campus access for military recruiters indirectly, through its Spending
Clause power. The Solomon Amendment gives universities a choice: Either allow military
recruiters the same access to students afforded any other recruiter or forgo certain federal funds.
Congress' decision to proceed indirectly does not reduce the deference given to Congress in the
area of military affairs. Congress' choice to promote its goal by creating a funding condition
deserves at least as deferential treatment as if Congress had imposed a mandate on universities."
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306.
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Netherlands to petition her Dutch partner as a spouse for fear of running afoul of national policy. (It is no surprise that in 2006, the Senate
voted on a proposed U.S. constitutional amendment to restrict marriage to a "husband" and "wife.") From a conservative viewpoint,
moreover, the deference granted to Congress in military and immigration matters springs from a common point - the concern over national
security. Perhaps unintentionally, Justice O'Connor supported this
point when she identified "national security" as a valid governmental
interest while implicitly noting its absence in the Lawrence case.5 4
In sum, I am less sanguine after reading FAIR than I was after
studying Romer or Lawrence. While I hope that the unanimous opinion in FAIR may be due to the Court's commitment to a robust First
Amendment right5 5 as well as its view that law schools were free to
reject the federal funding the law threatened to withhold,5 6 I think
that the underlying message for our issue of cultural migration across
the boundaries of sexual orientation and immigration policy is quite
negative. For Loving to be fully persuasive to judges committed to
the cultural norm that race is categorically different from sexual orientation may be too much to ask. Put differently, this reading of FAIR
supports the view that Romer and Lawrence were less about gay rights
than they were about individual rights: that Romer was about ensuring
that all persons had equal access to the political process, and that
Lawrence was about preserving the privacy of all persons to engage in
sexual relations within their homes. FAIR, therefore, becomes less
about protecting gays and lesbians than it is about respecting Congressional deference to military recruiting practices and ensuring equal
treatment for the military in its access to students.
To the extent that FAIR affirms the power of Congress, not only
over military matters, but also over antidiscrimination initiatives (implicit in its reference to fair employment rules), and given what we
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 ("Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such
as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage.") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
55. I have previously decried the Court's current First Amendment treatment of hate
speech. See Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech of 'Private Figures': Lessons in PowerBased Censorshipfrom Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1 (2001).
56. I must confess that I have never clearly understood what constitutes a valid choice for
an actor in any number of Supreme Court opinions, including the question of coercion in religious observances (see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding coercive attendance at a
public middle school graduation that featured a nondenominational prayer)) and in Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence (see, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (finding that South
Carolina was not coerced into enforcing a federal regulatory scheme, but was simply prohibited
from sending private driver's license information interstate)).
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have learned about Congress's concomitant power over immigration
law, perhaps the (second-)best solution to the physical, legal, and cultural barriers to movement faced by binational same-gender couples
today is via legislative action, and not by analogy to Loving. I will
explore possible congressional action in the concluding section below.
CONCLUSION: LOBBYING CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS:
THE UNITING AMERICAN FAMILIES ACT
While I wish that the legal divide that makes Congress's immigration power different from state power over marriage law (and while I
would prefer that the cultural divide that still exists between race and
sexual oricntation) did not persist today, perhaps the most realistic
approach at this point is to advocate for the bridging of the physical
gap that separates binational same-gender partners. First introduced
in 2000 by Congressman Jerrold Nadler of New York, the Uniting
American Families Act (UAFA) of 200557 is the most recent House
version of a bill designed to allow U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents to petition their foreign same-gender partners to immigrate
on the same grounds as heterosexual couples, except that these benefits will have no broader effect on state or federal laws referencing
marriage. Although it will surely not bridge all the legal and cultural
divides that treat same-gender marriages differently from heterosexual ones, the UAFA will eliminate the physical barrier that effectively
separates foreign same-gender partners from their U.S.-based counterparts while also leveraging Congress's plenary power over immigration to effect a significant, if incomplete, change to the immigration
law so that same-gender partners, while not the same as marital
spouses, may reap the same immigrant benefits.
As of this writing, congressional support for the bill is far from
overwhelming: barely a fourth of the House has agreed to co-sponsor
the bill, with barely a tenth of Senators providing similar support for
the Senate version.5 8 This is not surprising, given the large number of
other important issues in immigration law that Congress and the President have had to grapple with of late.
But my modest hope is that just as Loving v. Virginia captured
the imagination of the nation forty years ago, that at some point in the
57. H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005).
58. Updated information on the co-sponsorship of these bills is available from the Library
of Congress's THOMAS website, at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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not-too-distant future, the United States will recognize the injustice it
visits upon binational same-gender partnerships today. Just like the
Lovings, today's couples - from Adams and Sullivan, to Naughton
and his Spanish partner, to my (perhaps not so) hypothetical Maria
Camacho and Jacoba Mondriaan - are being forced either to move, to
migrate, to immigrate from their homes to other more hospitable
lands, or to remain fugitives from the law in these United States. This
is not a choice that they should be forced to make. In a country built
on immigrants and the promise of family unity, the United States
should see its way clear to taking steps to bring families together, not
tear them apart. 59 Let us not forget that the Lovings' flight from Virginia was a migration, and that their victory in the U.S. Supreme
Court was a victory over the physical, legal, and cultural barriers to
uniting families separated by invidious governmental discrimination.

59. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking local housing
ordinance as unduly burdening the family unit, one in which a grandmother lived with her two
grandsons who were first cousins).
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